The term "International Community" is commonly understood to refer either to the norms of international policy or to a coalition of concerned actors. However, in this article, we argue that it is the interplay of the term's image and the practice of its invocation that shapes its character. It can be used by many different groups, state and nonstate alike, to locate their political It can be used by many different groups, state and nonstate alike, to locate their political goals in the context of a wider array of values. Usually these norms are staterelated and can be used to simulate political relevance. Conversely, actors defying widely accepted values can be excluded and policies against them legitimized. Addressing domestic as well as international audiences, the claim to be acting as or on behalf of the "International Community" is mostly rhetorical but has very real political consequences.
Introduction troduction
O f the (scarce) literature on the "international com munity", a 2002 issue of Foreign Policy offers a broad impression of the concept's complexity. Nine think ers, policymakers, journalists and activists were asked about what the term constituted for them. Some authors identified the "international community" as "essentially, the United States and Europe" (Gowers 2002: 33) , or as "the United States joined by some allies and clients" (Chomsky 2002: 34) . Others excoriated it as "the false community composed of an inchoate global majority and organized ruling elites" (Bello 2002: 41) , or dismissed the term as being "for the naïve", since "[i]ts diffu sion of responsibility excuses countries that have no intention of lending a hand" (Wedgwood 2002: 44 ). Yet others viewed the "international community" as a body of globalized moral ideas that "can shape institutions and inform policy choices" (Hehir 2002: 38) and are enshrined in (international) law, institutions, and civil society, which together with states bear responsibil (Annan 2002) . For some, "the United Nations -the most universal international organization with 190 member states -is the closest embodiment of the in ternational community" (Ogata 2002: 39) , while for others, transnational civil society is the most promising locus of a "new community in the making [that] comprises many communities tied by common interests and values, but its social expression is inflected by different histories and cultures" (Bello 2002: 41) . As such, the "international community" not only comprises state actors and international organizations, but a wide range of transnational societal actors including international NGOs, social movements, and religious authorities. These views share the institutionalist idea that states and their societies are in creasingly interdependent and that today's problems need concerted action. In his "Doctrine of the International Com munity" Tony Blair (1999) outlined "that today more than ever before, we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour."
The perceptions and usages of the term "international commu nity" fit two broad categories: Normatively, the "international community" represents "some form of moral collectivity of hu mankind which exists as an ethical referent if not organized in any way" (Buzan/GonzalezPelaez 2005: 32). As a moral mark er, it bears the idea of universal values that are (or should be) shared by a majority of actors, and of an imperative of solidarity among states or even among all human beings (Kovach 2003; May 2007) . International institutions, especially international law, organizations -above all the UN -and regimes in various policy fields, such as environmental protection, disarmament, or human rights, are seen as precursors and foundations of a collective encompassing all states and, ultimately, their citi zens. Yet, power relations, domination and dependency are analytically largely missing.
Descriptively, the "international community" is a particular istic term "usually referring to the West, or more broadly to a set of liberal democratic states, although with overtones that this group somehow speaks (and sometimes acts) for human kind as a whole" (Buzan/GonzalezPelaez 2005: 32) . This no tion captures power asymmetries and points to corresponding functions of the idea of "international community" neglect ing universalistic goals. Yet, highlighting realist concepts such as power and interests disregards ideational factors that influ ence the "international community's" discursive and practical construction. This includes internal and external expectations, public opinion and control, the (self)binding effects of interna tional agreements, as well as social mechanisms of guilt, shame and honour (e.g. Lebow 2006; Schlichte/Veit 2007 : 1117 .
Escaping these categories' seeming antagonism, we claim that analytically, both approaches fall short of fully capturing the essence of the "international community". A concept of "inter national community" needs to account for different aspects of the phenomenon and offer analytical tools able to capture their implications for rhetoric and reality, instead of adding more layers to the discussion. Accordingly, we elaborate on the idea of the "international community" and its inherent aspects, and conclude with an overview of the contributions to this guest edited issue, all of which have been subject to two doubleblind reviews.
Capturing the "international community"
Aware of the term's diverse facets encompassing discourses as well as practices, we construe the "international community" as both a specific, but not a priori determined actor group, and a rhetorical device. It can be invoked by a range of actors from the local to the international level and for different purposes; its practical relevance derives from interests and ideas.
As an actor group, the "international community" is composed in relation to the policy issue concerned. Actors share values and norms or simply define political problems as concerning. They become involved in designing policy to tackle an issue that is framed as a matter of common interest or international importance. The "international community" is only called upon in specific situations, which tend to be compared to similar events and to be classified insinuating a certain set of reactions commonly accepted as appropriate. This can include labelling and demarcating actors as deviant. Hence, instead of being an allencompassing description of international poli tics' constituents, the "international community" helps to con struct ingroup/outgroup relations and may be an exclusive concept.
As a practical and rhetorical device, the "international com munity" can be invoked by different actors and for different purposes. Actors include state and nonstate agents as well as heterogeneous stakeholders straddling the contested field of in group/outgroup dichotomies. They can make use of the im age of and ideas attached to the "international community", as well as of tensions arising between image and practices. A common purpose of invoking the "international community" is the legitimization of domestic and international politics.
The dynamic composition and normative
foundation of the "international community"
In its most general sense, the "international community" is a discursively formed group of agents who interact in the inter national political realm. Its constituent parts can be specified with regard to a specific policy issue or political situation. It is simultaneously unspecific, however, in that the composition, normative foundations and functions of the "international community" can differ from case to case and may change dy namically over time. Its collective political action in the in ternational realm is at least partly codified in the UN system and international law. Yet, also political actions outside this system -like military interventions that are not authorised by the UN Security Council -can be discursively framed as poli tics by and/or in the name of the "international community". Especially when largescale emergencies occur -be it natural disasters, gross human rights abuses or genocide -the "inter national community" is supposed to be responsible for an ad equate response.
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As the implied set of "universal norms" is not necessarily agreed to by all, the concept is often used to construct them in the first place. In this context, political action is portrayed to be taken on behalf of a general will. This idea bears a notion of Rous seau's "volonté générale", which presupposes both the con stituents' intention to be a community and their common will to solve political problems. The idea of a general will portrays the "international community" as unitary problemsolving agency, although the actors involved may be voluntary con tributors or obliged to act due to security, economic, social or environmental concerns (cf. Ellis 2009). Hence, in reality, it is not as willbased and inclusive as it appears. The application of the concept nevertheless serves as a legitimization device for political action, disguising a lack of actual mechanisms to es tablish a common will; outside the proceedings of regular UN bodies, the "international community" acts on an emergency basis, rather than according to preprepared scripts of crisis management.
These practices show that the term is historic. As a value sys tem, "international community" cannot claim universal valid ity. While from the early 17th century the idea of a community of states guided philosophical reasoning about international law, only after 1945 has it found its way into material law (Tomuschat 1995) . Following the Cold War, liberalization of world politics intensified, in turn shaping normative perspec tives. Unless one subscribes to the view of an "End of History" (Fukuyama), this value system might itself be transformed over time. Such changes may take place fast, triggered by force (e.g. terrorism) or systemic collapse, for example of the world eco nomical structures. Usually, however, norms mutate gradually by different readings of law, by changes in its application or by emergent challenges calling for regulation (e.g. bird flu).
These regulations, in turn, reshape the views of the actors and their role in the "international community". As "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) shows, the sovereignty of states may be weak ened as a binding norm when state functions gain importance for the definition of statehood. R2P legitimizes international interventions in states that fail to adhere to their protective duties towards their population. This transforms the norm of sovereignty, which has been a constitutive element of inter national relations for the last centuries. However, this trans formation does not include all states, but rather reflects power relations. Also, as of yet, it can hardly be described as firmly codified. While the guiding image of international relations as being exclusively comprised of states has always overlooked societal factors, gradually the inviolability of sovereignty loses relevance even in legal terms.
The "international community" as a legitimization device
While reference to and formation of norms constitute the "in ternational community", they also serve to explain, justify and legitimize its political action. Much of these norms correlate with international law. All states have access to the UN General Assembly's Sixth Committee and other UN agencies, 2 which consider legal questions and help to prepare conventions. Also, resolutions of the UN Security Council (SC) -especially if they declare a certain behaviour as illegal -can have quasijudicial impact since they define legal terms and hence predetermine further perceptions of (il)legality (Samuels 2007: 6170 In addition, international/globalized media, as well as trans trans national societal actors play an important role in shaping societal actors play an important role in shaping political perceptions and triggering action. Until the ages of internet communications and influential nonWestern media outlets such as Al Jazeera, public discussions were mainly led by Western media corporations, and the norms represented as the "international community's" could well be regarded as "Westernturnedglobal" values. Since access to electronic me dia has become prevalent in most parts of the world, web logs ("blogs"), independent media, information platforms of advo cacy groups and activists as well as influential think tanks, such as the International Crisis Group, increasingly influence political agendasetting.
The actors constituting the "international community" in teract to frame their perceptions of reality to formulate policy (Goffman 1974). As such, the term "international community" can apply urgency to a matter which it may lose over time. The security policy importance following the 9/11 attacks is a case in point; the Taliban were condemned for their support of terrorism, and the "international community" supported their removal from power in Afghanistan by military means. The invocation of the term "international community" as signs a distinct phenomenon with relevance to all, keeping potential freeriders at bay: if an issue concerns all, individual actors cannot stay out of the political process without sidelin ing themselves. However, in practice, the actual commitment to political measures often differs widely within the "interna tional community" and is subject to disputes over what states or organizations ought to contribute -as vividly observable in the intricate bargaining processes regarding the international climate regime.
Finally, the concept allows keeping issues off the international agenda. While Afghanistan is a matter of the "international community", Chechnya was (and is) not; while global warm ing and its consequences are, the depletion of water and fertile soil are not. While piracy was not until recently, the "interna tional community" has now sent warships to the Horn of Af rica; after having been successfully "securitized" (Waever 1995 ), piracy will be on the "international community's" priority list for a while. Bringing a problem into the public sphere and de picting it in a way that stresses its meaning to state, corporate or cultural interests, and connecting it to the "international community's" obligation to take action adds to the legitimiza tion, which might be lacking otherwise. In a particular historic moment a group can thus make use of the term to enhance the validity of its own concerns (Kühn 2008).
The construction of exclusivity and its limits
International codified and customary law as a set of norms and values allows identifying and denouncing deviant behaviour. Although "international community" is an inclusive term, such labelling can demarcate outsiders and underscore the general validity of norms by demarcating aberrations. Also, it strengthens the "we"feeling of those within the group. This is in line with the English School's idea of international society, which "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain com mon interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules" (Bull 1977: 13 (Bull 1977: 41) . At the same time, it permits to lo cate where behaviour runs counter to basic assumptions about the rules, in turn reinforcing them.
However, "international community" transcends the ideas of international society in important ways. The English School's main focus rests on states' (conscious) behaviour in the inter national system. As the state system originates from historical developments in Europe, most of its basic values -such as sov ereignty, territoriality, or secularism -are those of the European nationstate. To ascribe them global validity means to assume that "imposed values represent a strong society" (Buzan 1991: 167) . Likewise, diverse and dynamic political challenges forbid the presupposition of rules, which states can know to exist and readily apply (Daase/Feske/Peters 2002: 268). Transnational re lations are shaped by constructions of reality that can hardly be described as originating exclusively from states.
In the "international community", state and nonstate ideas compete. On the state's level, perceived inequalities become the focal point of value discussions. The question of whether or not states may possess nuclear weapons is a case in point. Even G8 governments need to enhance the legitimacy of their policy against Iran's nuclear ambitions with a plea to the "in ternational community" to act "as a united front on the basis of a mutually agreed position", as they did at the 2007 Heiligen damm summit (G8 2007) . On the other hand, societal actors sometimes denounce the European form of statehood per se, for example on religious grounds. The Islamist's notion of an allencompassing "Ummah" (Islamic Nation) transcends state borders in this regard (Roy 2004: 9799) . Ideational conflicts put the legitimacy of stigmatizing actors as outsiders to a test. Therefore, the idea of "international community", while being aware of the Western origin of most of its norms, must be able to capture competition and sometimes antagonism of values.
Legitimacy, hence, seems to be crucially important if individual states are to be successfully labelled as outside the community. Referring to standards within the community, political pres sure can be exerted against those who fail to comply -beyond a Kantian notion of a foedus pacificum (League of Peace) of lib eral democracies acting against outsiders in selfdefence only (Giesen 2004) . This leads to a paradoxical situation in which actors are morally excluded from the community while legally and structurally still being part of it. Even though being framed as outgroup actors, deviators like "rogue states" remain part of the international system because excluding them from a valuebased ingroup does not deprive them of basic qualities like statehood or sovereignty (see Beck/Gerschewski in this vol ume). The "politics of inclusive exclusion" opens up a variety of possible reactions. For example, opposition groups can present themselves as part of a global norms community in order to advance their political stance, including calls for sanctions; the African National Congress (ANC) claimed " [b] etter to suffer the hardships of sanctions [...] than the brutalities of racial repres sion" (Cortright/Lopez 2002: 96) . This shows how blurred the internalexternal distinction can be: the global interrelation of world society which encompasses all states and societies simul taneously counteracts the constructed exclusion (Jung 2001).
The tension arising from the inconsistency between politics of exclusion and underlying inclusive structures creates leeway for navigating in and taking advantage of this complexity. A variety of actors, with mixed sets of ideas and interests, can make use of the concept of the "international community", transforming it case by case into quite a practical set of politi cal actions.
Invoking the "international community" -and its intricate effects
Legitimizing and/or pursuing specific policies by invoking the "international community" is open to actors on both sides of the ingroup/outgroup distinction. Hence, it is the intricate, not always intended ways in which its image and reality can take effect that have to be at the centre of analysis.
Two main audiences of "international community"related ac tions can be distinguished. One is the global public, that is the "international community" itself. Political actors, often gov ernments, but also societal actors pursuing specific goals, may strive for international resources -ideational (e.g. recognition, legitimacy) as well as material (e.g. investments, donor aid). Signing on to regimes and treaties to present oneself as equal is common practice among newly emerging states (see Forster Rothbart in this volume). Subscription to environmental pro tection, human rights, disarmament and other regimes intents to show a state's dedication to participate in the "grown up" field of international affairs. The Bosnian central government, for example, regards the participation in international inter ventions as a means to demonstrate the country's maturity to move on from being an international protectorate. Although this contribution is militarily negligible, the political action is highly symbolical (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009).
A second audience is the domestic one. In this regard, invok ing the "international community" may serve local state and nonstate actors to generate support for internal political power struggles. In June 2008, for example, Zimbabwean opposition leader, Tsvangirai called for intervention to support the quest to oust President Mugabe's authoritarian rule (Geoghegan 2008) . Likewise, civil society groups in Western states may refer to the "international community". For example, American activists press for the USA to join the International Criminal Court's Rome statute to allow it to support the prosecution of crimes against humanity by Sudanese officials. The activists point out that the USA has no legislation to pursue perpetrators itself -lagging behind the "international community's" legal stand ards (Lesser 2008).
The "international community's" role in domestic struggles can be real, as in the examples above, but it may also take forms of simulation. Groups at a substate level striving for ter ritorial secession use a range of techniques to gain or simply simulate international support. Local groups voice interests to a broader audience using modern communication, as in the internet campaigns by Burmese activists or supporters of the Zapatistas movement in Chiapas/Mexico. In Transdniestria, creating façade organizations, false websites and reports served the political leadership of the secessionist Moldovan region to legitimize its statebuilding project visàvis its constituency (see Isachenko in this volume).
Western states may point to a diffuse "international communi ty" to dilute responsibility and back off from action. In interna tional interventions, single states tend to deflect responsibility by citing the greater political weight of multilateral engage ment. Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan is a case in point; lead nations have either abandoned or handed over to other actors their failed reform efforts (see Gross in this volume). Denoted "rogue states" can profit from the fact that the "in ternational community" is not an allencompassing category, but a specific group of states sharing some beliefs, yet follow ing divergent interests and priorities. Factors such as energy demand and economic interests may undermine the efforts of the "international community", as with Iran where Russia and China hesitated to enforce policy against the country's nuclear ambitions (see Beck/Gerschewski in this volume).
Finally, institutional interests may guide actors to position themselves in the contested fields of in and outgroup defini tions. Implementation bodies such as environmental regimes' secretariats may strive to get more states to sign the regimes' contractual agreements, to fulfil their mandates and justify their existence (see Forster Rothbart in this volume). The in stitutional selfinterests of organizations find their satisfaction in, but also contribute to, the ambivalence between image and practice of the "international community".
Author's contributions
The dichotomy between rhetoric and reality is misleading. Also, the paradigmatic debate between normativeuniversal ist and empiricalparticularistic approaches fails to capture the issue's complexity. The "international community" is both rhetoric and reality, and it is the interplay between practical politics and its discursive construction, including the different meanings assigned to it by actors, upon which one needs to focus. Approaching it from different angles, the articles shed light upon different aspects of the concept of the "internation al community".
Eva Gross examines the changing images and actors of the "in ternational community" in the context of intervention and statebuilding in Afghanistan. The construction of an "interna tional community" of interveners concentrated, at first, on the ideal of a broad alliance of Western and nonWestern states; the UN was supposed to take a leading and coordinating role. However, increasing political fragmentation and a deteriorat ing security situation soon reshaped the image, now meaning the political and military commitment of Western states and organizations, namely EU and NATO. This stronger emphasis on the West undermined the image of the "international com munity" and confronted the Western actors with growing legit imization problems. Concerns about an emerging antiWestern counternarrative and about the regional impact of the inter vention have recently led to attempts to actively broaden the "international community" again by including regional actors such as Pakistan, Iran and India. Yet, as Gross observes, tensions among regional players and a lack of Western actors' willing ness to adopt inclusive concepts based on consensus among local, regional and international ideas indicate that simply redefining the "international community" will not resolve its inherent normative and practical contradictions.
Martin Beck and Johannes Gerschewski describe the paradoxical situation that "rogue states" are "simultaneously part of the in ternational community and excluded from it: their statehood makes them part of the Westphalian system from which they are banned at the same time." Firstly, they scrutinize what leads to the labelling of states as "rogues", namely authoritarianism on the internal level and/or pursuit of weapons of mass destruc tion. On the surface, these criteria seem to be clear and easily discernible, yet they have not only been used interchangeably, but also inconsistently. Furthermore, while intended to legiti mize political action, discursively excluding a state from the "international community" has selfentrapping implications for its members, as it impedes engagement of the "rogue". Sec ondly, the authors reflect upon "rogue states'" room for ma noeuvre under international sanctions. Political leeway mainly arises from the paradox between political exclusion and struc tural inclusion. Beck and Gerschewski point to inconsistencies of the "international community" from which a "rogue regime" may profit, as ongoing multipolarization of the international system renders the making of an inclusive "international com munity", encompassing powerful states such as China, Russia, or India increasingly difficult. Furthermore, normative incon sistencies of the "international community", for example dou ble standards of noninterference, provide "rogues" with argu ments against the sanctioning states. Additionally, "rogues" profit internally from their strength visàvis their society, which derives partly from structural inclusion in the world economy: states financing rule by economic or political rents
Introduction troduction1
A fter the fall of the Taliban, brought about in response to the attacks on 11 September 2001, the task of recon structing Afghanistan was placed under UN auspices both to lend legitimacy to international efforts and to coordi nate economic and political measures on the part of the vari ous international actors involved. Present at the creation of policies towards Afghanistan, however, were two factors that facilitated international fragmentation rather than a coherent and comprehensive approach. The first was the changing na ture of international coalitions: the US, rather than calling on NATO for support in its fight against the Taliban through Op eration Enduring Freedom (OEF), relied on adhoc coalitions of the willing, which put into question the role and purpose of military alliances in the post11 September era. The second was the emphasis -under the penmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN's Secretary General Special Representative -on a 'light footprint' approach that emphasized Afghan involvement in setting policy priorities (House of Commons 2003) . These two factors led to a severely fragmented international environment * Dr. Eva Gross, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The author wishes to thank the two anonymous review ers for their insightful comments, and the editors for their kind invitation to participate in this special issue. This article is peerreviewed.
in which reconstruction efforts have taken place to date. In light of the deteriorating security situation, the predominant discourse on Afghanistan has focused on military and politi cal commitments among Western actors -the US and its allies, NATO, but increasingly also the EU -rather than a concern with engaging the 'international community'. These actors, which for the purpose of this article will be referred to as 'the West', therefore, have eclipsed 'the international community' in discourses over how to 'fix' Afghanistan.
This article reviews changing images of the international com munity in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and shows that the challenge faced by NATO and other Western governments and institutions has not just led to efforts at increasing coordi nation but also to discussions over the potential contribution of regional actors. The article discusses this potential contri bution but concludes that the formulation of a regional strat egy is hampered by the heterogeneity of political and security concerns in Afghanistan's neighborhood and the lack of an overarching political strategy towards Afghanistan on the part of Western actors. It also concludes that the current discourse of a regional approach coupled with a renewed emphasis on the UN in coordinating international efforts have brought de bates over engagement in Afghanistan full circle. In light of a continued Western lead in both military and ideational terms,
